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Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other 
demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to 
Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic 
vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. 
If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as 
indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible to 
believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) 
in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice 
Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths 
and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic 
vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns 
out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers 
evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. 
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Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation  
1. Introduction 
Are hand dryers effective in killing the novel coronavirus? Do houseflies transmit the disease? 
Should you spray your body with or drink bleach to make sure you don’t get infected? Certainly 
not. But some people think so — in fact, sufficiently many people have believed these and other 
myths that the World Health Organization (WHO) decided to launch a campaign in order to 
make people aware of the dangerous and potentially lethal effects of believing them.1 Yet 18% of 
US residents in our sample endorse the statement that hand dryers are effective in killing the 
novel coronavirus. Likewise, 15% endorse the claim that Covid-19 can be transmitted through 
houseflies. And 19% endorse the claim that that spraying and introducing disinfectant into your 
body will protect you against Covid-19.  
 
Why would people believe that hand dryers kill the novel coronavirus? One reason is that social 
media are ripe with misinformation about Covid-19. Fact-checking organization AFP Fact Check 
says that the hand dryer myth can be traced back to a video, posted on Facebook on March 13, 
2020, and shared hundred thousand of times.2  
 
Yet the prevalence of misinformation does not provide a complete explanation for why people 
endorse myths about the novel coronavirus. Not everyone who is exposed to misinformation 
about Covid-19 ends up believing it. This raises the question whether we can identify differences 
 
1 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public/myth-
busters (accessed June 24, 2020). 
2 https://factcheck.afp.com/hot-air-saunas-hair-dryers-wont-prevent-or-treat-covid-19 (accessed 
June 24, 2020). 
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between people that explain why some are more susceptible to Covid-19 misinformation than 
others.  
 
Emerging research suggests that someone’s political identity is a key predictor of the extent to 
which they believe Covid-19 myths, with Republican-leaning US residents more likely and 
Democrat-leaning US residents less likely to believe them, as a Reuters/Ipsos poll suggests.3 
Moreover, it’s not just about beliefs, but also about behavior. The poll showed, for instance, that 
Republicans had changed their daily lives less extensively in response to news about the 
spreading pandemic than Democrats. 
 
But the partisan divide explains only a small part of individual differences in the susceptibility to 
Covid-19 myths and misinformation. In fact, our research suggests that demographic variables 
including political affiliation, educational achievement, age, gender, ethnicity, the importance of 
religion, income, and marital status together explain only about one third of variance in 
susceptibility to Covid-19 myths.  
 
What explains the remaining differences in susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation? This 
paper explores whether epistemic vice can explain why people believe Covid-19 myths. 
Epistemic vices are character traits and other dispositions that interfere with acquiring, 
maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. An epistemically vicious person might be fooled by a 
video about hand dryers and Covid-19 to believe that hot air protects against the disease, without 
 
3 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-polarization/americans-divided-on-
party-lines-over-risk-from-coronavirus-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN20T2O3 (accessed June 24, 
2020). 
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evaluating the evidence and counter-evidence, or without getting a second opinion. Vice 
epistemology explores to what extent people’s beliefs are determined by epistemic vices such as 
indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures. 
 
The philosophical literature on virtue and vice epistemology is wide, including theoretical work 
as well as applications to such domains as medical and business ethics, education, and law. Until 
recently, most of this work has focused more on virtue than vice. The empirical literature on 
epistemic virtue and vice is much smaller, and almost none of it focuses on vice. But without 
empirical corroboration, this theoretical work remains uncertain and its relevance to applied 
fields such as education dubious. 
 
The motivation of the present paper is that the Covid-19 pandemic offers an opportunity to study 
the role of epistemic vice in belief formation. More speculatively, we think that this type of 
research may be relevant to policymakers: if epistemic vice turns out to be relevant to health 
beliefs and behaviors, and if epistemic vice can be countered using educational or other 
interventions, then the public health response to Covid-19 may be bolstered by this line of 
research. 
 
If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with higher degrees of 
epistemic vice will tend to be more susceptible to Covid-19 myths. This is what we set out to 
study. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the 
level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale that we developed and 
validated (anonymized, working paper). We also asked participants questions eliciting whether 
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they subscribe to myths and misinformation about the coronavirus disease that were sufficiently 
widespread at the moment of data gathering (8-10 May 2020).  
 
We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that a person’s degree of epistemic vice is 
associated with the extent to which they believe such myths and misinformation. In fact, the 
association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, and the 
other demographic factors mentioned above. Adding our short measure of epistemic vice to the 
mentioned demographic variables increases the variance explained in individual differences in 
susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation from about one third to two thirds. Epistemic vice is 
also more strongly associated with endorsement of Covid-19 misinformation than other 
psychological measures, including personality, dogmatism, the Cognitive Reflection Test or need 
for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of 
vice epistemology. 
 
Sections 2 and 3 present some relevant background on Covid-19 myths and vice epistemology. 
Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 discusses these results and concludes. 
2. Prior work relevant to Covid-19 and belief formation 
Covid-19 is a respiratory disease caused by one type of coronavirus first identified in China in 
December 2019. Formally known as the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2), it is most often referred to by the name Covid-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) 
that the World Health Organization (WHO) gave to it in February 2020. While in the beginning 
it seemed that it would be restricted to China, it started spreading globally in March 2020, and 
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seems to have reached all but a dozen (mostly small) countries worldwide at the moment of 
writing. 
 
Covid-19 leads to mild or moderate respiratory symptoms in most patients. In older people and 
people with cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and other underlying conditions it is significantly 
more likely to develop into a serious illness. The disease is thought to have spread from animals 
to human beings in China in the second half of 2019. It is transmitted through the air via small 
droplets emitted when an infected person coughs or sneezes. It is estimated that a person who has 
the disease infects about two to four people, but that this infection rate can be and has been 
reduced when people take particular hygienic measures and keep physical distance from others. 
While infection rates have indeed gone down in some countries, at the time of writing this paper 
the global death toll is nearly half a million people, about 25% of whom were in the US. Over a 
hundred candidate vaccines are in clinical or preclinical evaluation, but so far no prevention or 
treatment is available or is expected to be available anytime soon. The most prominent strategies 
that governments have chosen include extensive restrictions on national and international travel, 
closing schools and universities, distance learning, restricting access to medical services, 
mandatory hygiene routines for shops and restaurants, curfews, and social or physical distancing 
(maintaining a distance from other people of at least 6 feet).  
 
The success of many of these measures depends on the ability and willingness of residents to 
conform to them, which in turn depends on whether they understand and appreciate the rationale 
behind the measures. A person who believes that the coronavirus doesn’t spread in warmer 
climates, as 22% of our respondents do, may see no reason for social distancing. False beliefs 
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can also gratuitously increase the burden of the disease. If you think that Covid-19 can be 
transmitted by houseflies, as 15% of respondents in our sample do, you may unnecessarily worry 
and possibly protect yourself against contact with houseflies.  
 
We find that myths about Covid-19 are prevalent at all educational levels and levels of income. 
Yet believing myths about Covid-19 is most harmful for people who are impoverished or 
otherwise vulnerable. Many people in the US may stand to lose their jobs if they refuse to work 
contact-intensive service jobs, and, lacking employment insurance, they may consequently have 
to choose between risking infection, on the one hand, and poverty or homelessness on the other.  
 
Before we continue our survey of relevant work, a disclaimer is in place to the effect that most of 
the studies we survey report very recent research and consequently have not gone through peer-
review yet, and we should avoid drawing overly hasty conclusions. We strongly believe that it is 
imperative that researchers attempt to learn as much as is necessary to contain the spread of 
Covid-19 misinformation, but research ethics and methodology should not be compromised. To 
our knowledge, the studies referenced here satisfy these criteria. 
 
Media scholars and other researchers have started studying the determinants of Covid-19 beliefs 
in various populations. As we mentioned in the Introduction, one key element seems to be 
political orientation. In a meticulously designed study, Allcott et al. (2020) compare the extent to 
which US residents follow social distancing measures in regions with higher versus lower 
proportions of Republican voters. Using geo-localized cell phone data they show that residents in 
regions with greater Republican support engage less in social distancing as compared with 
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regions with greater Democratic support. Barrios and Hochberg (2020) found that in counties 
with high support for President Trump the average resident searches less for information about 
the coronavirus on the internet than in counties with low support. While much of the extant 
research concerns the US, similarly polarized countries witness similar effect. In a study on 
Brazil, Ajzenman, Cavalcanti, and Da Mata (2020), for instance, found evidence to the effect 
that after public statements in which President Bolsonaro downplayed the severity of the 
coronavirus pandemic and came close to ridiculing the need for social distancing, residents in 
regions with greater governmental support engaged less in social distancing than those in regions 
with less support for the government. These findings are corroborated by numerous further 
studies (see, e.g., Grossman, Kim, Rexer, & Thirumurthy, 2020; Kushner Gadarian, Wallace 
Goodman, & Pepinsky, 2020; Painter & Qiu, 2020). 
 
Research on misinformation and the Covid-19 pandemic is scarcer. Some research tries to 
estimate the impact that various media have on the beliefs and behaviors of residents. Simonov, 
Sacher, Dubé, and Biswas (2020), for instance, show that the propensity of staying home as part 
of the measures to combat the spread of Covid-19 is negatively correlated with Fox News cable 
viewership. As Fox News hosts differed notoriously about the dangers of Covid-19, Bursztyn, 
Rao, Roth, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020) refined these findings: they show that counties with 
larger viewership of the Sean Hannity Show have greater numbers of Covid-19 cases and deaths 
than counties with larger Tucker Carlson Tonight viewership. The authors attribute the 
difference to the fact that while Tucker Carlson already started warning his viewers in early 
February 2020, Sean Hannity at first dismissed the risks.  
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Further noteworthy studies concern the effects of Covid-19 media on such things as panic buying 
(hoarding) (Kuruppu & De Zoysa, 2020), the intentional provision of misinformation globally 
(Milanovic & Schmitt, 2020), the use of suboptimal communication strategies by governments 
and policymakers (Romano, Sotis, Dominioni, & Guidi, 2020), and the incidence of misleading 
information about Covid-19 on YouTube (Li, Bailey, Huyhn, & Chan, 2020). 
 
Stanley, Barr, Peters, and Dr Paul Seli (2020) find that people who tend to be less willing to 
engage in effortful cognitive processes and inquiry are more likely to believe that Covid-19 is a 
hoax and less likely to engage in hygienic behaviors such as distancing and hand-washing. The 
instrument used to test willingness to engage in such cognitive processes was the well-known 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Sirota & Juanchich, 2018), which we discuss at further length below. 
Second, Pennycook, McPhetres, Zhang, Lu, and Rand (2020) examined willingness to share 
misinformation about Covid-19. Like Stanley et al. (2020), they found that participants who 
scored higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test had more accurate beliefs about the disease and 
how to avoid contracting it; in addition, such participants were less inclined to share 
misinformation.  
 
Most philosophical work on Covid-19 comes from applied ethics and political philosophy, and 
concerns such topics as the allocation of scarce medical resources (Emanuel et al., 2020), the 
hidden costs incurred by children and young people (Larcher & Brierley, 2020), the ethics of 
clinical trials (Bompart, 2020), utilitarian approaches to pandemics (Savulescu, Persson, & 
 11 
Wilkinson, 2020), and the use of triage procedures (Herreros, Gella, & Real de Asua, 2020).4 
Rahimi and Talebi Bezmin Abadi (2020), in a letter to the editor of The American Journal of 
Bioethics, consider potential issues to do with peer review, publication, and dissemination of 
scientific results about Covid-19. 
 
Yet, to our knowledge hardly any philosophical work on Covid-19 and epistemic topics has been 
published. A thorough bibliographic search (June 9, 2020) delivered only three English-language 
publications.5 Metz (2020) discusses in general the role of philosophy and philosophers during 
the pandemic. In an editorial for the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory, Neilson (2020) 
takes a critical theory perspective and considers epistemic violence in times of corona. And 
Coeckelbergh (2020) considers political epistemology.  
3. Epistemic vices 
Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with gaining, keeping, or sharing knowledge. 
They include close-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, and prejudice. Research on epistemic 
vices and their correlative epistemic virtues has mainly been conducted in philosophy, which has 
led to an emphasis on conceptual and theoretical matters (Battaly, 2008; Montmarquet, 1993; 
 
4 A more general statement from the Covid-19 task force of the Association of Bioethics 
Program is (McGuire et al., 2020) 
5 Search terms: (coronavirus OR covid-19) AND epistem*, June 9, 2020. Philosopher’s Index 
retrieves no references. PhilPaper besides the mentioned reference two non-English 
publications. Google Scholar gives 26 references, of which none to a philosophy paper. Online 
outlets not indexed by PhilPapers and Google Scholar retrieved by a Google search include the 
online Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, which a range of contributions on 
Covid-19 at https://social-epistemology.com/in-and-beyond-the-era-of-covid-19/ (accessed June 
9, 2020), and incidental blogs, of which a contribution by Erik Angner 
https://behavioralscientist.org/epistemic-humility-coronavirus-knowing-your-limits-in-a-
pandemic/ (accessed June 9, 2020) is most relevant to our concerns as he discusses the virtue of 
epistemic humility. 
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Roberts & Wood, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996). Epistemic virtue and vice are thought to be associated 
with educational achievement (Baehr, 2013), business and financial decision-making (de Bruin, 
2014), and susceptibility to conspiracy theories (Cassam, 2016).  
 
Epistemic vices differ from cognitive defects such as lowered IQ as a result of prenatal exposure 
to lead in that epistemic vices are always reprehensible, and sometimes blameworthy (Cassam, 
2019).  Unlike those who have a lower IQ as a result of lead poisoning, say, the bearers of 
epistemic vices are open to criticism for displaying epistemically vicious traits, because they are 
responsible either for acquiring these vices or for continuing to embody them.  
 
Epistemic vice also differs from cognitive biases, understood in a certain way (Cassam, 2019). 
Consider the availability heuristic as an example of a cognitive bias. The availability heuristic is 
the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater “availability” in memory. 
More recent and more emotionally charged memories tend to be more readily available to 
people. The availability heuristic gets in the way of knowledge because how recent or 
emotionally charged a memory is does not predict the likelihood of similar events well. In 
contrast to epistemic vices, cognitive biases such as the availability heuristic are universal in the 
sense that almost everyone can be led astray by them.6 Cognitive biases are sometimes resistant 
to revision because they operate largely unconsciously.  
 
 
6 Note that, in a suitably-constructed environment, the availability heuristic and its close 
counterpart, the recognition heuristic, can be quite reliable. However, in environments where 
exposure does not systematically track prevalence, the heuristic goes haywire. For an empirical 
investigation of this phenomenon, see Alfano and Skorburg (2018) 
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Yet there are other cognitive biases that are either modulated by epistemic vice or can even be 
regarded as epistemic vices in their own right. Consider confirmation bias, the tendency to search 
for information that confirms your preconceptions (Klayman, 1995). Confirmation bias can be 
checked by conscious effort. Genuinely curious and open-minded people should therefore be less 
likely to undermine knowledge by falling into confirmation bias. 
 
Only recently have researchers started to interrogate the empirical underpinnings of epistemic 
virtues and vices (Fairweather & Flanagan, 2014). There has also been interest by psychologists, 
experimental philosophers, and researchers on education in notions closely related to epistemic 
virtue (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Tetlock, 1983, 2005; Tetlock, Kristel, Beth, Green, & 
Lerner, 2000). Some measures for individual virtues and vices have been proposed in the 
literature, for instance by Alfano et al. (2017) and Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016). 
 
In this paper, we use the newly-developed Epistemic Vice Scale (EVS) to predict acceptance of 
Covid-19 misinformation. The EVS has two subscales, indifference and rigidity. Indifference 
manifests itself in a lack of motivation to find the truth. Rigidity manifests itself in being 
insensitive to evidence. These two subscales relate a range of traits that the philosophical 
literature suggests form the core of epistemic vice, such as arrogance, imperviousness to 
evidence, and gullibility. To our knowledge, the resulting ten-item scale is the first instrument to 






998 participants were recruited and compensated using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. 
The data collection was part of a pre-registered observational study.7 The eligibility criteria were 
living in the United States and being 18 years or older. Ages ranged from the bracket 18-29 years 
to the bracket 74 years and up, with the median respondent falling in the age bracket 30-39 years, 
consistent with the most recent US census data. 63% of participants were male, as compared 
with 49% in the general population. 68% had a bachelor’s or higher level of education, as 
compared with 32% in the general population. Median household income was in the bracket 
between $50,000 and $74,999 per year, consistent with the median income of $63,000 in the 
general population. 55% of respondents were married; 34% had never married; 7% were 
divorced; 2% separated; and 2% widowed. 38% of respondents identified as Republican to 
various degrees; 47% as Democrats; and 15% as Independent. 74% of respondents were 
White/Caucasian; 12% were Black or African American; 5% Hispanic; 7% Asian or Pacific 
Islander; and 2% American Indian or Alaskan Native. 49% of respondents rated religion as not at 
all important or not very important; 18% as moderately important, and 33% as important or 
extremely important. 
Our sample is more male and more educated than the US as a whole, and probably also slightly 
less religious and less Republican, although different ways of eliciting this information make 
comparisons difficult. In order to check the robustness of our results, we conducted the 
correlation and regression analyses described below on several split samples: only female 
 
7 Pre-registered with <anonymized for peer-review>.  
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respondents; only Republicans; only respondents with less formal education than a bachelor’s 
degree; only respondents in whose life religion plays an important role. All results are 




Epistemic Vice Scale. To study potential epistemically vicious tendencies of respondents, we 
administered the Epistemic Vice Scale (EVS), a ten-item instrument to measure epistemic vice. 
The scale has two subscales, Indifference and Rigidity. Indifference manifests itself in a lack of 
motivation to find the truth. Rigidity manifests itself in being insensitive to evidence.  
 
The scale has been rigorously validated and has good psychometric properties. Structural 
equation modelling meets Hu and Bentler’s standards of fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999) (χ2(34) = 
150, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .03). Cronbach’s Alpha is .90 for the whole scale, .90 
for the Indifference subscale, and .83 for the Rigidity subscale.  
 
Here we focus on showing the relationship between the EVS and endorsement of Covid-19 
misinformation. Table 1 shows the items, which were administered to participants in random 
order. Participants were asked to respond to the items on a five-point, fully-anchored Likert scale 
(1 = “strongly disagree,” 2 = “somewhat disagree,” 3 = “neither agree nor disagree,” 4 = 
“somewhat agree,” 5 = “strongly agree”). The indifference score is calculated as the mean of 
items 1-4; the rigidity score as a mean of items 5-10.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
Covid-19 Misinformation.  To study the propensity of respondents to endorse Covid-19 related 
misinformation, we administered a 12-item measure of Covid-19-related misinformation based 
on the “myth-busting” page of the World Health Organization (Table 2).8  Examples of the 
myths included in the study are: “Being able to hold your breath for 10 seconds or more without 
coughing or feeling discomfort means you are free from the coronavirus disease,” “Spraying and 
introducing disinfectant into your body will protect you against COVID-19,” and “Regularly 
rinsing your nose with saline helps prevent infection with the new coronavirus.” Items were 
administered in random order. Participants were asked to respond on a fully anchored five-point 
Likert scale (1 = “Definity false,” 2 = “Probably false,” 3 = “Don’t know,” 4 = “Probably true,” 
5 = “Definitely true”). We randomly inserted two control items with claims about Covid-19 that 
were common knowledge at the moment of conducting the survey to check whether respondents 
read the items attentively and gave their best answers. The high endorsement scores of 90% for 
the item “Some people infected with coronavirus experience no symptoms” and 91% for “Older 
people are more likely to die due to an infection with Covid-19” suggest that responses are of 
high quality. The Covid-19 misinformation score is calculated as the mean of the responses to 
the first ten items, excluding the control items. “Don’t know” responses were excluded from the 
analysis on a per-item basis; that is, if a respondent replied “Don’t know” on one or more items, 




busters (accessed May 8, 2020). 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Demographic information and other scales. In order to evaluate to what extent epistemic vice 
explains variation in the tendency to endorse misinformation, we elicited demographic 
information and other relevant psychological constructs.  
 
We elicited demographic information about age, educational attainment, income, gender, 
ethnicity, the importance of religion, and marital status. In addition, we measured political 
partisanship by asking participants whether respondents “consider themselves a Republican, a 
Democrat, an Independent, or what?” Responses were “Strong Democrat,” “Moderate 
Democrat,” “Lean Democrat,” “Lean Republican,” “Moderate Republican,” “Strong 
Republican,” “Independent,” “Other,” and “Prefer not to say”. We replaced “Independent” with 
missing rather than placing Independents in-between Republican and Democratic responses. For 
robustness we also ran analyses with dummies for Democrats, Republicans, and Independents 
respectively, which did not affect our results.  
 
We elicited related psychological constructs by administering nine scales. First, we measured all 
dimensions of the Big Six personality model using the 24-item QB6, measuring Honesty, 
Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience 
(Thalmayer and Saucier 2014). Second, we administered a seven-item version of the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, measuring the tendency to override an incorrect “gut” response and engage in 
further reflection to find a correct answer (Sirota & Juanchich, 2018). Third, we administered 
Rosenberg’s 10-item self-esteem scale, measuring feelings of self-worth (Rosenberg, 1965). 
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Fourth, we administered a 15-item scale of need for closure, measuring aversion toward 
ambiguity (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Fifth, we administered an 18-item scale of need for 
cognition, measuring tendency to engage in and enjoy activities that require thinking (Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1984). Sixth, we administered a 15-item scale of faith in intuition, measuring the 
tendency to rely on intuitive information processing (Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2012). 
Seventh, we administered the general version of a 6-item scale of open-minded cognition, 
measuring willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives (Price, Ottati, Wilson, & 
Kim, 2015). Eighth, we administered a 20-item dogmatism scale, measuring the tendency to 
consider views as undeniably true (Altemeyer, 2002). Ninth and finally, we administered a 6-
item scale of trust in experts, measuring the tendency to trust experts over lay people, adapted 
from Imhoff, Lamberty, and Klein (2018).  
 
Hypotheses. Before conducting the study, we recorded our hypotheses in the process of pre-
registration. We expected EVS and its subscales to be 1) strongly positively correlated with 
endorsement of Covid-19 misinformation; 2) positively correlated with the scales measuring 
faith in intuition, dogmatism, and need for closure; and 3) negatively correlated with all other 
scales: personality, cognitive reflection, self-esteem, need for cognition, open-minded cognition, 
and trust in experts. In addition, we expected 4) religiosity to be positively correlated with 
endorsement of Covid-19 misinformation; and 5) Republican political identity to be positively 




Epistemic vice explains susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation, over and above the 
demographic information and the other psychological scales. 
 
The type of explanation we are after is operationalized by accounting for variance in individual 
differences in Covid-19 misinformation using regression models. Note that this notion of 
explanation falls short of, but is consistent with, establishing causation. Given the observational 
data we have collected, we can only establish association between variables.    
 
4.2 Analysis and Results 
 
The analysis proceeded in three steps. First, in order to test whether more epistemically vicious 
respondents are more likely to endorse Covid-19 misinformation, we analyzed the relationship 
between their scores on the Epistemic Vice Scale, as well as on the rigidity and indifference 
subscales, and the Covid-19 misinformation score. Second, to put the strength of the associations 
between epistemic vice and misinformation in context, we analyzed correlations of 
misinformation with epistemic vice, demographic variables, and other psychological scales. 
Third, to understand whether epistemic vice explains variance in endorsement of Covid-19 
misinformation over and above that explained by demographic variables and other psychological 
measures, we conducted a hierarchical regression.  
 
Epistemic vice and Covid-19 misinformation. Table 3 gives an overview of how well the EVS 
score works as a predictor of susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. Respondents are 
classified according to their mean EVS score and their Covid-19 misinformation score. 751 
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respondents had an EVS score of 3 or less. We categorized these respondents in the low 
epistemic vice group, as they strongly disagreed, disagreed, or responded “neither agree nor 
disagree” on average across the ten EVS items. 89% of respondents in this group have a low 
Covid-19 misinformation score, indicating that they endorsed at most one of the coronavirus 
myths. Just 11% of respondents in this group had higher misinformation scores, with the 
overwhelming majority in the “medium” group, endorsing 2-5 Covid-19 myths. 
 
169 respondents fell into the medium epistemic vice category, defined by an EVS score between 
3 (“neither agree or disagree”) and 4 (“somewhat agree”). 43% of respondents in this group fell 
into the medium category on Covid-19 misinformation, 30% into the high category endorsing 5-
10 Covid-19 myths. 27% of respondents had low susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation 
despite their medium EVS score.  
 
78 respondents had an EVS score greater than 4. 80% or respondents in this group were highly 
susceptible to Covid-19 misinformation. That leaves just 20% with lower misinformation scores, 
which the overwhelming majority in the medium, rather than the low, category.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 




Figure 1 illustrates the strength of the relationship between epistemic vice and susceptibility to 
Covid-19 misinformation. The position of the tiles on the heatmap is determined by the 
indifference score (y-axis) and the rigidity score (x-axis). For instance, tiles representing 
respondents scoring high on indifference and rigidity are situated in the top-right quadrant. The 
color of each tile is determined by the average Covid-19 misinformation score for respondents 
with the respective scores. Red coloring means that respondents endorsed misinformation items 
on average as true. Blue coloring means that respondents rejected misinformation items on 
average.  
 
The top-right quadrant of the graph represents 184 individuals whose indifference and rigidity 
scores are both greater than or equal to 3. This part of the graph is overwhelmingly red and 
orange, indicating that high scores on both dimensions of epistemic vice are associated with 
endorsement of misinformation (mean Covid-19 misinformation score = 3.48, SD = 1.1). By 
contrast, the lower-left quadrant of the graph is overwhelmingly blue (536 observations), 
indicating rejection of misinformation (mean Covid-19 misinformation score = 1.31, SD = 0.4). 
To determine whether the difference is significant, we performed a two-sided, two-sample 
Welch’s t test, testing against the alternative hypothesis that the true mean Covid-19 
misinformation score by respondents in the lower-left quadrant is not different from the true 
mean Covid-19 misinformation score in the top-right quadrant. The result strongly suggests to 
reject the alternative hypothesis, indicating that the Covid-19 misinformation mean for responses 
in the bottom-left quarter is indeed lower than for responses in the top-right quarter (t(196) = -
26.0, p < 0.0001, Welch-Satterthwaite).  
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Respondents represented in the bottom-right quadrant of the graph are motivated to gain 
knowledge but are also rigid in their thinking (264 observations). They have on average lower 
Covid-19 misinformation scores than in the top-right quadrant, but higher scores than 
respondents in the bottom-left quadrant (mean Covid-19 misinformation score = 1.94, SD = .9). 
Differences between the Covid-19 misinformation scores of respondents in the bottom-right 
quadrant to misinformation scores both of respondents in the top-right quadrant and in the 
bottom-left quadrant are highly significant (t(335) = -15.6, p < 0.0001, and t(311) = -10.7, p < 
0.0001, respectively). We speculate that respondents in the bottom-right quadrant might be 
particularly open to interventions to address rigidity in their thinking, because they are already 
properly motivated.  
 
The top-left quadrant of the graph has few observations (18). This indicates that few respondents 
indicated that they were indifferent to knowledge yet were not rigid in their thinking. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 summarizes the epistemic vice scores of respondents “at risk” of endorsing Covid-19 
misinformation, compared to respondents with a low susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. 
71% of respondents showed low susceptibility to misinformation. That leaves 29% of 
respondents in our sample susceptible, almost half of whom are highly susceptible.  
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EVS scores as well as scores for the indifference and rigidity subscales increase with rising 
susceptibility. Two-sided Welch’s t tests for each of the differences suggest that each is highly 
statistically significant (p < 0.0001).  
 
On the EVS as well as rigidity subscale, medium or highly susceptible respondents scored above 
3 on average. Mean indifference scores were somewhat lower across the board, indicating that 
people are more reluctant to describe themselves as indifferent than as rigid.  
 
Correlation analysis. Figure 2 shows correlation coefficients between the Covid-19 
misinformation score (column 1) and all other measures (rows). The correlations between the 
EVS and Covid-19 misinformation is strongest, at .76 (all correlations are pairwise Pearson 
correlations). Correlations of misinformation with the two subscales are similarly strong: 72 for 
indifference and .68 for rigidity. These high correlations hold as well on subsamples that we 
selected to test the robustness of our results (see “Data” section above on the representativeness 
of our sample for the US population). On these subsamples, we find: among female respondents, 
the correlation between the EVS and Covid-19 misinformation is .75 (n = 371); among 
republicans it is .75 (n = 343); on the subsample containing only respondents with less formal 
education than a bachelor’s degree it is .48 (n = 288); among respondents in whose life religion 
plays an important role it is .76 (n = 505). The further results reported below are qualitatively the 
same for the split samples. 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 24 
 
Measures for competing explanations such as political affiliation and the Cognitive Reflection 
Test are less strongly associated with Covid-19 misinformation. The measure with the next-
highest correlation, dogmatism, shows a substantially lower correlation with Covid-19 
misinformation than epistemic vice. The correlation of political affiliation with Covid-19 
misinformation is less than a third of the correlation between epistemic vice and Covid-19 
misinformation (note that in our measure of political affiliations, higher values indicate greater 
identification with Republican positions).  
 
We conceptually replicate the findings of Stanley et al. (2020) and Pennycook et al. (2020) that 
the Cognitive Reflection Test predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation (their outcome 
variable was measured slightly different, but the headline result is the same). Yet the absolute 
value of the correlation coefficient of cognitive reflection with Covid-19 misinformation (-.39) is 
only about half of the correlation coefficient of epistemic vice with Covid-19 misinformation 
(.76). This gives epistemic vice a fairly strong lead over alternative measures.  
 
The associations between the EVS subscales and other measures all have the expected sign, with 
the exception of education. We would have expected that higher levels of formal education are 
associated with lower readiness to endorse fake news. Yet the opposite is the case. We could 
only speculate as to the explanation of this finding.  
 
None of the correlations between the epistemic vice subscales and other measures is so high to 
suggest that the EVS is tapping into a construct for which a measure already exists. Indeed, the 
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correlation of epistemic vice with Covid-19 misinformation is stronger than the association of 
any of the other measures with either of the epistemic vice subscales. The closest correlates of 
epistemic vice are dogmatism, faith in intuition, and open-mindedness, each with coefficient 
absolute values above .5. Yet none of these measures is as closely associated with Covid-19 
misinformation as epistemic vice is. This lends support to the vice epistemological supposition 
that epistemic vice is a distinct theoretical and empirical construct. 
  
 
Regression analysis. The results so far indicate that epistemic vice is more strongly associated 
with Covid-19 misinformation than other measures, and that epistemic vice is a distinct construct 
from all of the other measures considered. Yet our central hypothesis remains to be tested. Does 
the EVS predict endorsement of Covid-19 misinformation above and beyond what already 
established measures can predict? So far, while we have found that the EVS correlates more 
strongly than other individual measures with Covid-19 misinformation, we have not yet shown 
that the force of the EVS is little more than that of a combination of other measures, which, if it 
were the case, would affect its usefulness. Hence our last task is to examine what EVS adds to 
the other scales. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
We performed a hierarchical regression with the Covid-19 misinformation score as dependent 
variable. We tested how much variance in the Covid-19 misinformation scores the indifference 
and rigidity subscales predicted above and beyond other measures individually, and other 
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measures combined. Table 5 summarizes the results. Each row compares two ordinary least 
squares regression models with the Covid-19 misinformation score as dependent variable. The 
first model includes the measure(s) listed in the “Measures” column. The second model includes 
additionally the indifference and rigidity scores of the Epistemic Vice Scale. The columns “R2 
without EVS” and “R2 with EVS” show the amount of variance the respective models explain; 
the column “ΔR2” is the difference between the two columns. Positive values for ΔR2 indicate 
that the model with the epistemic vice subscales predicts more variance as measured by R2 than 
the corresponding model without the epistemic vice scores.9 The difference that adding the 
epistemic vice subscales makes is substantial. For each individual measure, adding epistemic 
vice to the regression at least doubles the variance explained, increasing R2 in every case to 
above .5.  
 
Importantly, epistemic vice explains additional variance of .09 even when all other measures are 
included in the regression. Table 6 in the appendix provides the detailed results of this final 
hierarchical regression. Both models are ordinary least square regressions with the Covid-19 
misinformation score as dependent variable. All continuous predictors as well as the dependent 
variable are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. The two epistemic vice subscales 
have the largest coefficients (.39 for indifference and .19 for rigidity) and are significant at the 
1% level. This result strongly supports our hypothesis that the EVS explains additional variance 
with regard to Covid-19 misinformation, over and above the demographic information and the 
other psychological scales.  
 
9 R2 is a statistical measure that represents the proportion of the variance for a variable — in our 
case the Covid-19 misinformation score — that is explained by the variables included in the 





This paper demonstrates that a compact and easily administered self-report questionnaire — the 
Epistemic Vice Scale — greatly outperforms existing measures, including the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, in predicting susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. 
 
People who accept Covid-19 misinformation may be more likely to put themselves and others at 
risk, to strain already overburdened medical systems and infrastructures, and to spread 
misinformation to others. Of particular concern is the prospect that a vaccine for the novel 
coronavirus will be rejected by a sizeable proportion of the population because they have been 
taken in by misinformation about the safety or effectiveness of the vaccine. Conspiracy theories 
about possible treatments have already spread online and even led to protests calling for the 
arrest of Bill Gates, whose foundation is funding research into potential vaccines.10 Sullivan et 
al. (2020) have found that anti-vaccine accounts on Twitter have both greater reach and greater 
receptivity than pro-vaccine accounts, which should make public health officials and 
policymakers alert to the possibility that, even if a vaccine for the novel coronavirus is found, 
herd immunity may remain out of reach due to vaccine hesitancy and resistance.  
 
We believe that the results reported in this paper show that policymakers may benefit from 
paying attention to the role epistemic virtue and vice play in the uptake of information and 
 
10 https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/may/12/vaccines-5g-bill-gates-why-are-australians-
gathering-to-spread-coronavirus-conspiracy-theories (accessed June 24, 2020). 
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misinformation. Policy might be developed to help people boost virtue or depress vice, and we 
believe that emerging research may be useful here. Pennycook et al. (2020), for instance, found 
that simply nudging people to think about accuracy led to their accepting and sharing less 
misinformation about Covid-19, so it may be possible to contain the spread of misinformation 
with relatively anodyne interventions rather than, for instance, censorship. More ambitiously, we 
might hope to develop interventions that help people overcome their epistemic rigidity or 
indifference. Whether such interventions would need to be longitudinal and embedded in 
elementary and higher education, or could be one-off trainings for adults, remains to be seen. 
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1 I am not very interested in understanding things. 
2 I am not so interested in the reasons why. 
3 I am not particularly curious to learn new things. 
4 I do not much enjoy gaining knowledge. 
Rigidity 
5 It’s more important to have a stable worldview than to be open-minded. 
6 I make up my mind without much fuss about the many factors that may affect an issue. 
7 I tend to make decisions based on my gut feeling. 
8 I tend to be too confident in my opinions. 
9 I often have strong opinions about issues I don’t know much about. 
10 I tend to feel sure about my views even if I don’t have much evidence. 




Item Description Endorsement 
1 Adding pepper to your meals prevents COVID-19. 16% 
2 COVID-19 can be transmitted through houseflies. 15% 
3 Spraying and introducing disinfectant into your body will protect 
you against COVID-19. 
19% 
4 Drinking methanol, ethanol or bleach prevents COVID-19. 13% 
5 5G mobile networks spread COVID-19. 11% 
6 Exposing yourself to the sun or to temperatures higher than 77°F 
prevents the coronavirus disease. 
22% 
7 Catching Covid-19 means you will have it for life. 15% 
8 Being able to hold your breath for 10 seconds or more without 
coughing or feeling discomfort means you are free from the 
Coronavirus disease. 
23% 
9 Hand dryers are effective in killing coronavirus. 18% 
10 Regularly rinsing your nose with saline helps prevent infection 
with Covid-19. 
22% 
11* Some people infected with coronavirus experience no symptoms. 91% 
12* Older people are more likely to die due to an infection with 
Covid-19. 
90% 
Endorsement: if respondents replied “probably true” or “definitely true”.  
* control items not included in calculation of mean score 
Table 2: Items of the Covid-19 misinformation instrument  
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  Covid-19 misinformation score 
EVS score Low (0-1) Medium (2-5) High (5-10) Observations 
Low (≤ 3) 89% 9% 2% 751 
Medium (> 3, ≤ 4) 27% 43% 30% 169 
High (> 4) 5% 15% 80% 78 







Figure 1: Heatmap of Covid-19 misinformation score in relation to the Indifference and Rigidity 
dimensions of the Epistemic Vice Scale, based on 998 observations. Higher indifference and 














Low (0-1) 714 (71%) 2.11 (0.62) 2.47 (0.73) 1.57 (0.68) 
Medium (2-5) 153 (16%) 3.07 (0.68) 3.46 (0.69) 2.48 (1.01) 
High (5-10) 131 (13%) 3.87 (0.66) 4.06 (0.57) 3.59 (1.06) 





Figure 2: The table shows correlations between covariates in percentages (pairwise Pearson 
correlations). Purple indicates negative correlations, orange indicates positive correlations. The 






Measures R2 without EVS R2 with EVS ΔR2 
All demographic variables*  0.37 0.63 0.26 
Dogmatism 0.22 0.59 0.37 
Faith in intuition 0.21 0.59 0.38 
All six personality traits 0.29 0.60 0.31 
Importance of religion 0.17 0.60 0.43 
Open-mindedness 0.18 0.59 0.41 
Cognitive reflection 0.15 0.59 0.44 
Self-esteem 0.12 0.59 0.47 
Need for closure 0.09 0.59 0.50 
Trust in experts 0.09 0.59 0.50 
Need for cognition 0.06 0.60 0.54 
Political affiliation 0.09 0.60 0.51 
All of the above 0.58 0.67 0.09 
Table 5: Results of hierarchical regression analysis.  
* Included demographic variables: Education, political affiliation, importance of religion, age, 
gender, income, marital status, ethnicity  
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  Model 1 Model 2 
Epistemic vice: Indifference         0.39*** 
          (0.03)    
Epistemic vice: Rigidity         0.19*** 
          (0.04)    
Education 0.11*** 0.08*** 
  (0.02)    (0.02)    
Religion 0.12*** 0.08*** 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Age -0.07**  -0.05*   
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Female -0.14**  -0.10*   
  (0.05)    (0.04)    
Income -0.08**  -0.08*** 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Political Affiliation     
Strong Democrat (Dummy) 0.27 0.10 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Modertate Democrat (Dummy) 0.16 0.00 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Lean Democrat (Dummy) 0.13 -0.02 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Independent (Dummy) 0.13 0.00 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Lean Republican (Dummy) 0.16 0.03 
  (0.18)    (0.15)    
Moderate Republican (Dummy) 0.11 0.00 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Strong Republican (Dummy) 0.38*   0.14 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Maritial Status     
Married (Dummy) 0.50*   0.35 
  (0.24)    (0.21)    
Widowed (Dummy) 0.46 0.36 
  (0.29)    (0.26)    
Divorced (Dummy) 0.28 0.15 
  (0.26)    (0.23)    
Separated (Dummy) 0.50 0.43 
  (0.29)    (0.25)    
Never Married (Dummy) 0.15 0.12 
  (0.24)    (0.21)    
Ethnicity     
American Indian or Alaskan Native (Dummy) 0.33 -0.04 
  (0.24)    (0.22)    
Asian or Pacific Islander (Dummy) 0.06 -0.06 
  (0.19)    (0.17)    
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Black or African American (Dummy) 0.20 0.09 
  (0.18)    (0.16)    
Hispanic (Dummy) 0.09 -0.01 
  (0.20)    (0.17)    
White / Caucasian (Dummy) -0.05 -0.08 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    
Personality     
Honesty -0.16*** -0.09*** 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Agreeableness -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Emotionality 0.10**  0.05 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Extroversion -0.01 0.01 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Conscientiousness -0.08**  -0.03 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Intellect -0.15*** -0.06**  
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Need for cognition 0.11*** 0.15*** 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Selfesteem -0.20*** -0.14*** 
  (0.04)    (0.03)    
Cognitive reflection -0.12*** -0.07**  
  (0.02)    (0.02)    
Need for closure 0.09**  0.02 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Faith in intuition 0.12*** 0.02 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Open-mindedness -0.04 0.06*   
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Dogmatism 0.08**  0.03 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    
Trust in experts -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    
Constant -0.51 -0.20 
  (0.33)    (0.29)    
Observations 973 973 
R2 0.58 0.67 
ΔR2   0.09 
Table 6: Detailed regression results with the corona misinformation score as dependent variable, 
comparing the full model without epistemic vice (Model 1) to the full model including epistemic 
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vice (Model 2). Numbers in brackets are standard errors. All continuous predictors are mean-
centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
